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Democratic elections in Kenya in 2002 were sup-posed to have heralded a period of intense politicaland economic reform. At the start of its term in
office, the government of Mwai Kibaki did undertake a
number of important reforms, including the creation of a
special unit tasked with overseeing the fight against cor-
ruption and fraud. Unfortunately, the reform process soon
ran into trouble. The governing coalition disintegrated and
factional strife reemerged—much of it along ethnic lines.
The government’s commitment to reduce the power of the
presidency was soon abandoned. Moreover, grand-scale
corruption accompanied the end of the reform process. 
But there are hopeful signs in Kenya and other parts
of Africa. The end of Daniel arap Moi’s autocratic rule
reinvigorated the democratic forces in the country. The
young generation especially treats Kenya’s politicians
with growing skepticism, and civil society and the media
are increasingly active in exposing corruption and mis-
rule there. The process of public awakening is not partic-
ular to Kenya. Globalization and technological change
are having noticeable empowering effects on African
youth. With growing frequency, demands for account-
ability and a better government are being heard through-
out the continent. 
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Executive Summary
Introduction
In December 2002, the National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC) came to power in Kenya as
a result of democratic elections. That event
ended 24 years of a stifling autocratic rule by
Daniel arap Moi and his Kenya African
National Union (KANU). Moi had ceded
democratic space with reluctance and in bad
faith. He had gone to every length to confuse;
bribe; intimidate; and, at times, injure or
eliminate the forces of change in the 1990s.
One of the most important developments
that came as a result of the peaceful transi-
tion at the end of 2002 was the entrenchment
and further expansion of democratic space
that had been fought for and won bitterly
over the past few decades. Kenyans had not
so much voted for this or that party. Rather,
they voted for change. They voted for a
change in the way they were governed and
hoped for a more accountable and transpar-
ent government. They were tired of the old
order and wanted something new, something
better. They were also excited that, at the last
minute, the opposition had finally united.
That hunger for change was not a uniquely
Kenyan phenomenon. Across the African
continent similar expectations of change
were coalescing and continue to do so. 
The National Rainbow
Coalition Undertakes
Important Reforms
Within months of the election, the new
administration had embarked on an ambitious
program of reform that included, among other
measures, the creation of a Ministry of Justice
and Constitutional Affairs, my own appoint-
ment as the permanent secretary in charge of
governance and ethics, and the appointment of
a new director of public institutions, who was
charged to create a special unit to address cor-
ruption, serious crime, fraud, and asset forfei-
ture. The Anti-Corruption and Economic
Crimes Act of 2003 was signed into law by
Kenya’s new president, Mwai Kibaki. The
process of institutionalizing the resultant
Kenyan anti-corruption commission as the pre-
mier anticorruption agency was completed at
the end of 2004. 
The government also established the Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights, cre-
ated a specialized cabinet committee on cor-
ruption, and institutionalized the declaration
of assets and liabilities by public officials after
passing the Public Officer Ethics Act in 2003.
In addition, the Goldenberg Commission of
Enquiry was established to get to the bottom
of the Goldenberg scandal of the early 1990s,
in which corrupt government officials hood-
winked the Kenyan taxpayer out of approxi-
mately US$1 billion. The Commission on
Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public Land
and the National Anti-Corruption Campaign
were established, as was the Task Force on
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, with the
aim of ascertaining public opinion as to
whether a truth commission should be set up.
There was also a dramatic reform of the judi-
ciary that saw 50 percent of the top judges
removed from office. 
The Coalition Begins 
to Unravel
It is important to note that all the reforms
discussed above were initiated within the first
nine months of the Kibaki administration.
Unfortunately, disagreements over the consti-
tutional review process, the powers of the pres-
idency, and the inability to agree on the post of
the prime minister splintered the NARC coali-
tion. Virtually overnight, NARC became dys-
functional, with the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) pitted against the National Alliance
Party of Kenya (NAK). The constitutional
reform process of 2003 culminated in the
November 2005 referendum on the proposed
constitution. The referendum became an
arena in which the internal disagreements
within the coalition were played out.
Those disagreements could have been
anticipated, since in the immediate after-
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math of the single-party state in 1991, the
oppositions splintered along ethnic lines.
Individual parties drew support from partic-
ular areas dominated by specific ethnic
groups that were mobilized along tribal lines
by individual leaders on the basis of their
past, present, and future promises of deliver-
ing more political patronage. It was such a
splintering of the political elite—encouraged
enthusiastically by the then-ruling party—
that characterized politics between 1992 and
2002. The unification of the opposition
behind Mwai Kibaki and under the NARC
banner managed to push KANU out of
power, but that unity was temporary. 
As the disagreements within the coalition
deepened, some members of the leadership
wanted to preserve NARC as one political
entity. They argued that since NARC had
contested the election as a single party, it
should remain together and be further
strengthened. Others argued that the NARC
coalition had come together to remove
KANU from power. Now that KANU had
been defeated, there was no need for NARC’s
unity to continue. 
The first, “centralizing” group of leaders
harked back to the era of the 1960s and 70s,
when the Kenyan economy grew under the
authoritarian rule of President Jomo Kenyatta.
Their view was based on an implicit, and ulti-
mately destructive, notion that Kenyatta’s
Kikuyu tribe and the associated communities
possessed the capacity to get the economy mov-
ing again after a period of prolonged incompe-
tence, looting, and resulting stagnation. That
implicit organizing idea around which many
members of the ruling elite coalesced manifest-
ed itself in a number of ways, including, for
example, with regard to early appointments of
senior public officials, including myself. 
More destructively, it manifested itself in
the arrogance of those who believed that the
Kikuyu tribe would produce economic
growth and be allowed some “excesses” in
return. That was a model that was reasonably
successful during the Cold War and had only
started to falter in the mid 1980s, when the
Moi regime consolidated. By 2004, it began
to look as though the state was dominated by
“Cold Warriors” seeking to impose their
1970s political ideals on the new realities
around them. 
Young People Are 
Changing Africa
But the Cold War had ended. Young peo-
ple—influenced by television, radio, the
Internet, and mobile phones—who now make
up a majority of the population, do not
remember Jomo Kenyatta—except for what
they read about him. In the cities, the young
generation speaks its own language, “Sheng,”
which is a combination of English and
Kiswahili. They are less deferential toward
their leaders than their parents were. They are
better educated and more exposed to the
world than any preceding generation. There
are both negative and positive aspects of those
developments. These changes hold true—in
varying degrees—for the whole of Africa.
Moreover, the relevance of Africa’s former
development partners and of foreign aid has
declined since the end of the Cold War. That
was in part the result of the West’s disengage-
ment from directly supporting the corrupt
central government and its support for civil
society in the 1980s and 1990s. Other factors
leading to the decline of Western influence in
Africa included reduction of the government’s
capacity to absorb aid, improved tax collection
that decreased Africa’s reliance on foreign aid,
and the rise of political correctness that saw
conditional lending as “imperialistic.” 
The 1990s saw an unleashing of many free-
doms, which changed the way in which
Africans see themselves. In particular, there
emerged a more confident urban population,
which, while acknowledging the shortcom-
ings of life in Africa, also feels an affinity with
urban young around the world. That is espe-
cially true with respect to access to informa-
tion, for technological interconnectedness has
heightened expectations among the young.
Today, African governments have to be sensi-
tive to those expectations or risk political
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crises. Consequently, foreign aid, although
still important to those countries that receive
budgetary support and infusions of emer-
gency aid to mitigate natural disasters, might
also be less relevant in the minds and hearts of
an entire generation of young Africans whose
outlook is more global. Throughout the
1980s and 90s, Africa was the world’s least
globalized continent. Moreover, the informa-
tion age arrived when Africa’s own institutions
were at their weakest and the suppression of
the intellectual class at its worst, in the 1980s.
However, successful elections in a country like
Kenya, in which the electorate clearly articu-
lated its wishes, point to a strengthening of
the democratic process. 
Politics and Corruption
By the end of 2003, there was a perception
that a small group of Kikuyu, the so-called
“Mount Kenya mafia,” dominated all key
political decisions. At the same time, the idea
of a monolithic single party (NARC) domi-
nated by the Kikuyu came to be resisted by all
of its larger constituent parties. By that time,
the institutional instruments that could have
been used to iron out some of the disagree-
ments between NARC members had atro-
phied. There was a sense that the anti-cor-
ruption drive was being driven off-course by
the power struggle within the coalition.
From that moment on, two factions within
NARC, the NAK and the LDP, became preoc-
cupied with containing one another. 
Two fundamental choices faced the Kibaki
administration when it was confronted with
disagreements within the NARC coalition.
First, the administration could have aggres-
sively continued down the path of reform.
Unfortunately, those who controlled the levers
of power were unable or unwilling to conceive
of a more diffused power structure and water-
ing down of presidential powers. Second, the
administration could have reverted to a
monolithic party structure and tried to con-
solidate power in the hands of a smaller clique
of people, who would hold onto their power
using a mixture of some real reforms, public
relations, and dubiously financed political
patronage. The second option turned out to
be more familiar and, perhaps, easier. I believe
that the setbacks in the fight against corrup-
tion in Kenya during the Kibaki administra-
tion resulted from opting for that second
choice. What the reformers wanted was to
implement bureaucratic and institutional
reforms that were necessary for Kenya to move
forward. Unfortunately, a far more conserva-
tive instinct had kicked in at the same time.
The fight against corruption came to a halt. 
At the heart of grand corruption in Kenya
is a series of financial arrangements that
together make up a system of security-related
procurement, procurement of commercial
debt, and financing of the political system.
For example, at the beginning of 2004, the
government had granted a contract worth
about $41 million to an entity that did not
exist. The Kenyan anticorruption authority
proceeded to investigate the case. Suddenly,
about $1.3 million that had been paid out as
a “commitment fee” by the Kenyan govern-
ment, was returned. We proceeded to discov-
er that there were several other such entities.
When we started to enquire about them,
more refunds started to pour in. By August
2004, about $12 million had been returned
to the Kenyan government. It became obvi-
ous that some of those transactions were
conducted by members of the administra-
tion to raise money for political financing. 
It turned out that our enquiries were not
only about investigation of particular crimes,
followed by arrests and court proceedings;
they shook the entire political system. Of
course, one result of those enquiries was that
I had to leave Nairobi and my government
position for exile in Great Britain. Some of
my colleagues have justified their corrupt
practices by claiming that they needed
money to pay for political campaigns. I am
amused that in Great Britain there is much
controversy over relatively small amounts of
money—a few million pounds. That is noth-
ing compared to the amount of resources
mobilized for politics in Kenya. 
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Vote Buying in Kenya
The good news is that vote buying no longer
seems to work. If it did, in 2002 the ruling
KANU party candidate, who had more money,
would have won. Similarly, in the 2005 referen-
dum on the Kenyan Constitution, the ruling
elite lost despite having, by its own admission,
enough resources to win. I have personally wit-
nessed offerings of cash, T-shirts, and food in
exchange for votes. But Kenyan democracy has
reached a new level. If you are a politician in
Kenya today, people will line up and take your
money, your T-shirts, and your food, but they
will vote their consciences. These days, the
worst effects of dubiously acquired resources
on the political process are felt when the money
is disbursed within small groups of decision-
makers, such as, for example, members of
Parliament. A million dollars here and there can
change individual decisions, but $100 million
can no longer buy an election in Kenya.
Bearing that positive development in mind,
it is unfortunate that the reform process did
not continue. When it comes to derailing the
Kenyan anti-corruption drive, the cabinet
reshuffle in June 2004 proved pivotal, as it saw
inclusion in the cabinet of opposition legisla-
tors, marginalization of the LDP faction, and
the subsequent slowing down of the reform
process. The administration also attempted to
consolidate its position via the constitutional
referendum of 2005. In fact, the referendum
turned out to be less about the proposed con-
stitutional changes and more about a power
struggle between two groups in the cabinet. 
One group supported the new constitution
and was assigned the banana symbol by the
electoral commission of Kenya. The oppo-
nents were assigned the orange symbol. The
oranges promptly formed a movement that
traversed the country, campaigning against
the new constitution mainly on the grounds
of excessive powers of the presidency that had
been left intact in the new draft. As the banana
and orange campaigns progressed, they deteri-
orated into crude ethnic mobilizations. The
fear of domination by the largest ethnic
group, the Kikuyu, turned out to be the most
important tool of political mobilization avail-
able to unethical Kenyan politicians. It no
doubt contributed to the outcome of the ref-
erendum—a resounding loss for the banana
camp at the hands of the oranges.
That a sitting government could lose a ref-
erendum despite its access to resources was
not entirely surprising. What was surprising
was the unwillingness of the banana leaders to
draw lessons from their defeat. The president
used the defeat in the referendum to sack the
entire cabinet and replace it with the same old
faces minus, of course, the rebellious minis-
ters, who had supported the orange camp. The
process of making the cabinet appointments
was fraught with unprecedented difficulties,
with several ministers initially refusing to take
their positions and negotiating with a politi-
cally weakened executive for a bigger slice of
the cake along ethnic lines. 
At the end of the day, the referendum
became a vote of confidence in the elite and
the administration. It was more about cor-
ruption than the constitution; more about
the concerns regarding ethnic domination
than new citizenship; more about jobs not
created than undeniable economic achieve-
ments; and, ultimately, it was about the per-
ceived failure to deliver in good faith a more
equitable constitution itself. 
The Critical Role of Civil
Society and Free Media
One of the most important developments
that resulted from the peaceful transition at
the end of 2002 was the entrenchment and
further expansion of the democratic space
that had been fought for and won over the
previous decade in particular. Indeed, the
already sophisticated media and civil society
sectors in Kenya became bolder than ever.
That was in part because those who were now
in government were former members of the
opposition, which meant that the press had
unprecedented access to the higher echelons
of government. We were all old friends, previ-
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ously united against KANU. Ministers and
civil servants were regularly seen giving inter-
views on television and heard on radio talk
shows. Similarly, civil servants—who were pre-
viously afraid to speak out about maladminis-
tration, perceived abuses, and corruption—
now complained, often in writing, to their
ministers, to civil society, and sometimes even
to the media. Indeed despite all the difficul-
ties, the most impressive achievement of the
NARC administration was the freeing up of
the democratic space that allowed the media
to speak so forcefully about corruption and
other ills. 
Unfortunately, the government has been
struggling to keep up with changes in Kenyan
society, as well as with the high expectations of
an increasingly informed and confident elec-
torate. The police raid on The Standard newspa-
per in March 2006, for example, inflicted heavy
damage on the government’s much-prized rep-
utation for openness. Balaclava-clad police
burst into the premises of a major newspaper
group, harassing and intimidating journalists,
disabling equipment, and generally causing a
scene in a manner that seemed more for show
than for effect. Indeed, the only effect of the
raid thus far has been to embolden the media
and cause a further loss of confidence in the
administration’s democratic credentials both
locally and internationally—despite the fact
that Kenya is being led by a president whose
reputation for political tolerance compared to
his predecessors remains unchallenged. 
The raid amounts to the most significant
challenge to press freedom in Kenya in a long
time. That is critical because well institution-
alized, sophisticated, commercially indepen-
dent, and assured of its own importance as a
keeper of Kenya’s democracy, the media is
crucial to the way that the democratic system
works. After all, until recently the media was
the main vehicle for the political account-
ability of the government officials. 
Although the attack provoked widespread
and understandable outrage, both locally
and internationally, and even led to demon-
strations in the streets of Nairobi, it has not
caused a fundamental loss of faith on the
part of Kenyans in Kenya. Such setbacks,
bizarre and outrageous as they are, seem thus
far to be well absorbed by an increasingly
mature and sophisticated body politic,
whose unspoken response is “see you at the
next elections.” Indeed, people realize that
there is an extent to which this developing
trend of intolerant behavior on the part of
the administration is merely symptomatic of
the internal disagreements in what used to be
called a coalition government and is now
called a government of national unity. 
Despite the above setbacks, two important
achievements have been made. First, Kenyans
are learning that public service means service to
the nation and not personal gain. The public no
longer accepts the weary excuse of “receiving
orders from above” that led to breaking of the
law and the abuse of public trust in the past. So,
a culture of political accountability is beginning
to take root. That will lead to increasing calls for
greater presidential accountability in Kenya in
particular. Such development might signal pos-
itive changes across the continent, where presi-
dential accountability is still in its infancy.
Second, the setbacks on the democratic front
are not causing a generalized feeling of decline,
despondency, and failure. Kenyans seem to pity
the government as much as they are outraged
by it. The government’s failures cause them to
laugh as much as they provoke the public’s
anger. Even the government’s threats have not
been able to inculcate fear, in part because the
government does not seem to have the compe-
tence to carry them out even if it wanted to. 
Ultimately, the fight against corruption
will be defined by political developments.
Since so much of the political class is tarred by
corruption, it may be necessary for a new polit-
ical alternative to emerge in Kenya. Even so,
the kind of corruption that we have seen in
Kenya in the past is unlikely to repeat itself in
the future. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, there are three problems
that must be resolved with regard to the future
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of the fight against corruption in Kenya. First,
national security and government procure-
ment have become the last refuge of the cor-
rupt. Second, Africans have to decide who
should pay for democracy in Africa. We need
to learn how to win elections without stealing
money or getting resources from special inter-
est groups. Third, we need to learn how to
make the fight against corruption more effec-
tive. It seems that restitution is more impor-
tant than prosecution in the fight against cor-
ruption. Corrupt people want to go to court.
They can keep fighting the legal battles for a
decade and their lawyers tend to be better paid
than government lawyers. It is far more effec-
tive to demand restitution, which takes money
away from the corrupt, freezes their assets, and
locks their accounts. 
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